In an Acegi Security deployment, Acegi Security is responsible for this user interaction typically via a reference to a ContextHolder -managed Authentication object.
Each of these callback handlers implement JaasAuthenticationCallbackHandler. In most cases these callback handlers can simply be used without understanding the internal mechanics. JAAS works with principals.
Acegi Security, on the other hand, works with Authentication objects. Each Authentication object contains a single principal, and multiple GrantedAuthority []s. A call to LoginContext. However, there is a TestAuthorityGranter in the unit tests that demonstrates a simple AuthorityGranter implementation.
Acegi Security provides a web filter org. SiteminderAuthenticationProcessingFilter that can be used to process requests that have been pre-authenticated by Computer Associates' Siteminder. This filter assumes that you're using Siteminder for authentication , and your application or backing datasource is used for authorization.
The use of Siteminder for authorization is not yet directly supported by Acegi. Recall that a Siteminder agent is set up on your web server to intercept a user's first call to your application. This agent redirects the initial request to a login page, and only after successful authentication does your application receive the request.
Please refer to your company's "single sign-on" group for header details. The first step in setting up Acegi's Siteminder support is to define an authenticationProcessingFilter bean and give it an authenticationManager to use, as well as to tell it where to send users upon success and failure and where to find the Siteminder username and password values. Most people won't need the password value since Siteminder has already authenticated the user, so it's typical to use the same header for both.
Since this authenticationProcessingFilter depends on an authenticationManager , we'll need to define one:. Note that it must reference one or more provider s defined below.
Note that your daoAuthenticationProvider above will expect the password property to match what it expects. In this case, authentication has already been handled by Siteminder and you've specified the same HTTP header for both username and password, so you can code daoAuthenticationProvider to simply make sure the username and password values match. This may sound like a security weakness, but remember that users have to authenticate with Siteminder before your application ever receives the requests, so the purpose of your daoAuthenticationProvider should simply be to assign roles and other properties needed by subsequent method interceptors, etc.
Finally we need to tell the filterChainProxy to include the authenticationProcessingFilter in its operations. The user's identity will then be passed to the authenticationManager and finally daoAuthenticationProvider will do the work of authorizing the user against back-end databases, etc.
With the heavy use of interfaces throughout the authentication system Authentication , AuthenticationManager , AuthenticationProvider and UserDetailsService it might be confusing to a new user to know which part of the authentication system to customize. In general, the following is recommended:. Use the UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken implementation where possible. It is the fastest and safest way to integrate an external database.
Never enable the TestingAuthenticationProvider on a production system. Doing so will allow any client to simply present a TestingAuthenticationToken and obtain whatever access they request. Adding a new AuthenticationProvider is sufficient to support most custom authentication requirements.
Only unusual requirements would require the ProviderManager to be replaced with a different AuthenticationManager. As briefly mentioned in the Authentication section, all Authentication implementations are required to store an array of GrantedAuthority objects. These represent the authorities that have been granted to the principal.
The GrantedAuthority objects are inserted into the Authentication object by the AuthenticationManager and are later read by AccessDecisionManager s when making authorization decisions. If a GrantedAuthority cannot be precisely represented as a String , the GrantedAuthority is considered "complex" and getAuthority must return null. An example of a "complex" GrantedAuthority would be an implementation that stores a list of operations and authority thresholds that apply to different customer account numbers.
Representing this complex GrantedAuthority as a String would be quite complex, and as a result the getAuthority method should return null. This will indicate to any AccessDecisionManager that it will need to specifically support the GrantedAuthority implementation in order to understand its contents.
This allows any user-specified String to be converted into a GrantedAuthority. All AuthenticationProvider s included with the security architecture use GrantedAuthorityImpl to populate the Authentication object. The AccessDecisionManager is called by the AbstractSecurityInterceptor and is responsible for making final access control decisions.
The AccessDecisionManager interface contains three methods:. As can be seen from the first method, the AccessDecisionManager is passed via method parameters all information that is likely to be of value in assessing an authorization decision.
In particular, passing the secure Object enables those arguments contained in the actual secure object invocation to be inspected. For example, let's assume the secure object was a MethodInvocation. It would be easy to query the MethodInvocation for any Customer argument, and then implement some sort of security logic in the AccessDecisionManager to ensure the principal is permitted to operate on that customer.
Implementations are expected to throw an AccessDeniedException if access is denied. The supports Class method is called by a security interceptor implementation to ensure the configured AccessDecisionManager supports the type of secure object that the security interceptor will present.
Whilst users can implement their own AccessDecisionManager to control all aspects of authorization, the Acegi Security System for Spring includes several AccessDecisionManager implementations that are based on voting. Figure 4 illustrates the relevant classes. Figure 4: Voting Decision Manager. Using this approach, a series of AccessDecisionVoter implementations are polled on an authorization decision. The AccessDecisionManager then decides whether or not to throw an AccessDeniedException based on its assessment of the votes.
The ConsensusBased implementation will grant or deny access based on the consensus of non-abstain votes. Properties are provided to control behavior in the event of an equality of votes or if all votes are abstain. Like the ConsensusBased implementation, there is a parameter that controls the behavior if all voters abstain. Like the other implementations, there is a parameter that controls the behaviour if all voters abstain. It is possible to implement a custom AccessDecisionManager that tallies votes differently.
For example, votes from a particular AccessDecisionVoter might receive additional weighting, whilst a deny vote from a particular voter may have a veto effect. It integrates with Acegi Security's AclManager discussed later. This voter is designed to have multiple instances in the same application context, such as:. When those methods are invoked, the above applicable voter defined above would vote to grant or deny access. The voter would look at the method invocation to locate the first argument of type sample.
Contact , and then pass that Contact to the AclManager. Assuming that ACL contains one of the listed requirePermission s, the voter will vote to grant access. If the ACL does not contain one of the permissions defined against the voter, the voter will vote to deny access. BasicAclEntryVoter is an important class as it allows you to build truly complex applications with domain object security entirely defined in the application context. If you're interested in learning more about Acegi Security's ACL capabilities and how best to apply them, please see the ACL and "After Invocation" sections of this reference guide, and the Contacts sample application.
It is also possible to implement a custom AccessDecisionVoter. If voting, it queries the MethodInvocation to extract the owner of the Contact object that is subject of the method call.
It votes to grant access if the Contact owner matches the principal presented in the Authentication object. It could have just as easily compared the Contact owner with some GrantedAuthority the Authentication object presented.
All of this is achieved with relatively few lines of code and demonstrates the flexibility of the authorization model. The tag libraries are known as authz and provide a range of different services. All taglib classes are included in the core acegi-security-xx. This means for JSP 1. If you're using a JSP 1. The following fragment is added to web. AuthorizeTag is used to include content if the current principal holds certain GrantedAuthority s. The authz:authorize tag declares the following attributes:.
You'll note that in each attribute you can list multiple roles. Simply separate the roles using a comma. The authorize tag ignores whitespace in attributes. The tag library logically ANDs all of it's parameters together. This means that if you combine two or more attributes, all attributes must be true for the tag to output it's body. By requiring all attributes to return true, the authorize tag allows you to create more complex authorization scenarios.
One last item: the tag verifies the authorizations in a specific order: first ifNotGranted , then ifAllGranted , and finally, ifAnyGranted. AuthenticationTag is used to simply output a property of the current principal's Authentication.
This tag would cause the principal's name to be output. Here we are assuming the Authentication. AclTag is used to include content if the current principal has a ACL to the indicated domain object.
This tag would cause the tag's body to be output if the principal holds either permission 16 or permission 1 for the "contact" domain object. The numbers are actually integers that are used with AbstractBasicAclEntry bit masking. Given there are several ways to achieve similar authorization outcomes in the Acegi Security System for Spring, the following general recommendations are made:. Grant authorities using GrantedAuthorityImpl where possible.
Because it is already supported by the Acegi Security System for Spring, you avoid the need to create custom AuthenticationManager or AuthenticationProvider implementations simply to populate the Authentication object with a custom GrantedAuthority.
Writing an AccessDecisionVoter implementation and using either ConsensusBased , AffirmativeBased or UnanimousBased as the AccessDecisionManager may be the best approach to implementing your custom access decision rules.
Whilst the AccessDecisionManager is called by the AbstractSecurityInterceptor before proceeding with the secure object invocation, some applications need a way of modifying the object actually returned by the secure object invocation.
Whilst you could easily implement your own AOP concern to achieve this, Acegi Security provides a convenient hook that has several concrete implementations that integrate with its ACL capabilities. Figure 5: After Invocation Implementation. Indeed multiple providers can modify the object, as the result of the previous provider is passed to the next in the list. Please be aware that if you're using AfterInvocationManager , you will still need configuration attributes that allow the MethodSecurityInterceptor 's AccessDecisionManager to allow an operation.
If you're using the typical Acegi Security included AccessDecisionManager implementations, having no configuration attributes defined for a particular secure method invocation will cause each AccessDecisionVoter to abstain from voting.
You may avoid this potential issue by either i setting " allowIfAllAbstainDecisions " to true although this is generally not recommended or ii simply ensure that there is at least one configuration attribute that an AccessDecisionVoter will vote to grant access for.
A common services layer method we've all written at one stage or another looks like this:. Quite often, only principals with permission to read the Contact should be allowed to obtain it. This is because the identity of the Contact is all that is available before the secure object is invoked. The provider will thrown an AccessDeniedException if one of the listed requirePermission s is not held by the Authentication. It is designed to remove Collection or array elements for which a principal does not have access.
It never thrown an AccessDeniedException - simply silently removes the offending elements. The provider is configured as follows:. As you can imagine, the returned Object must be a Collection or array for this provider to operate. It will remove any element if the AclManager indicates the Authentication does not hold one of the listed requirePermission s.
The Contacts sample application demonstrates these two AfterInvocationProvider s. This only occurs if the original Authentication object was successfully processed by the AuthenticationManager and AccessDecisionManager. The RunAsManager will indicate the replacement Authentication object, if any, that should be used during the SecurityInterceptorCallback. By temporarily replacing the Authentication object during a SecurityInterceptorCallback , the secured invocation will be able to call other objects which require different authentication and authorization credentials.
It will also be able to perform any internal security checks for specific GrantedAuthority objects. Because Acegi Security provides a number of helper classes that automatically configure remoting protocols based on the contents of the ContextHolder , these run-as replacements are particularly useful when calling remote web services. The first method returns the Authentication object that should replace the existing Authentication object for the duration of the method invocation.
If the method returns null , it indicates no replacement should be made. The second method is used by the AbstractSecurityInterceptor as part of its startup validation of configuration attributes. The supports Class method is called by a security interceptor implementation to ensure the configured RunAsManager supports the type of secure object that the security interceptor will present.
It needs to be authenticated by the AuthenticationManager , probably via delegation to a suitable AuthenticationProvider.
It simply accepts as valid any RunAsUserToken presented. To ensure malicious code does not create a RunAsUserToken and present it for guaranteed acceptance by the RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider , the hash of a key is stored in all generated tokens. The RunAsUserToken is immutable after creation for security reasons. Everything presented so far assumes one thing: the SecurityContextHolder is populated with a valid SecurityContext , which in turn contains a valid Authentication object.
Developers are free to do this in whichever way they like, such as directly calling the relevant objects at runtime. However, several classes have been provided to make this process transparent in many situations. We call these classes "authentication mechanisms". The org.
An authentication processing mechanism is solely concerned with received an authentication request from the principal, testing if it seems valid, and if so, placing the authentication request token onto the SecurityContextHolder.
Of course, if the authentication request is invalid, the authentication processing mechanism is responsible for informing the principal in whatever way is appropriate to the protocol. Recall the HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter discussed in the context section is responsible for storing the SecurityContextHolder contents between invocations.
This means no authentication processing mechanism need ever interact directly with HttpSession. Indeed HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter has been designed to minimise the unnecessary creation of HttpSession s, as might occur when using Basic authentication for example.
There are several authentication processing mechanisms included with Acegi Security, which will be briefly discussed in this chapter. The most popular and almost always recommended approach is HTTP Form Authentication, which uses a login form to authenticate the user. The final and generally unrecommended approach is via Container Adapters, which allow supported web containers to perform the authentication themselves.
The filter is defined in web. The application context will need to define the AuthenticationProcessingFilter :. The configured AuthenticationManager processes each authentication request. If authentication fails, the browser will be redirected to the authenticationFailureUrl. If authentication is successful, the resulting Authentication object will be placed into the SecurityContextHolder. This attribute is automatically set by the SecurityEnforcementFilter when an AuthenticationException occurs, so that after login is completed the user can return to what they were trying to access.
Because this authentication approach is fully contained within a single web application, HTTP Form Authentication is recommended to be used instead of Container Adapters. This can be used for authenticating calls made by Spring remoting protocols such as Hessian and Burlap , as well as normal user agents such as Internet Explorer and Navigator. Basic Authentication is an attractive approach to authentication, because it is very widely deployed in user agents and implementation is extremely simple it's just a Base64 encoding of the username:password, specified in a HTTP header.
The application context will need to define the BasicProcessingFilter and its required collaborator:. If authentication fails, the configured AuthenticationEntryPoint will be used to retry the authentication process. If the authentication event was successful, or authentication was not attempted because the HTTP header did not contain a supported authentication request, the filter chain will continue as normal.
The only time the filter chain will be interrupted is if authentication fails and the AuthenticationEntryPoint is called, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Digest Authentication attempts to solve many of the weakenesses of Basic authentication, specifically by ensuring credentials are never sent in clear text across the wire. Most user agents implement RFC Digest Authentication is definitely the most secure choice between Form Authentication, Basic Authentication and Digest Authentication, although extra security also means more complex user agent implementations.
Central to Digest Authentication is a "nonce". This is a value the server generates. Acegi Security's nonce adopts the following format:. The DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint has a property specifying the key used for generating the nonce tokens, along with a nonceValiditySeconds property for determining the expiration time default , which equals five minutes. Whilstever the nonce is valid, the digest is computed by concatenating various strings including the username, password, nonce, URI being requested, a client-generated nonce merely a random value which the user agent generates each request , the realm name etc, then performing an MD5 hash.
Both the server and user agent perform this digest computation, resulting in different hash codes if they disagree on an included value eg password. This tells the user agent there is no need to disturb the user as the password and username etc is correct , but simply to try again using a new nonce.
Extremely secure applications should note that an intercepted authentication header can be used to impersonate the principal until the expirationTime contained in the nonce is reached. Because of the more complex implementation of Digest Authentication, there are often user agent issues. For example, Internet Explorer fails to present an " opaque " token on subsequent requests in the same session. The Acegi Security filters therefore encapsulate all state information into the " nonce " token instead.
In our testing, the Acegi Security implementation works reliably with FireFox and Internet Explorer, correctly handling nonce timeouts etc. Now that we've reviewed the theory, let's see how to use it. The application context will need to define the DigestProcessingFilter and its required collaborators:. The configured UserDetailsService is needed because DigestProcessingFilter must have direct access to the clear text password of a user. Like BasicAuthenticationFilter , if authentication is successful an Authentication request token will be placed into the SecurityContextHolder.
If the authentication event was successful, or authentication was not attempted because the HTTP header did not contain a Digest Authentication request, the filter chain will continue as normal.
Digest Authentication's RFC offers a range of additional features to further increase security. For example, the nonce can be changed on every request. Despite this, the Acegi Security implementation was designed to minimise the complexity of the implementation and the doubtless user agent incompatibilities that would emerge , and avoid needing to store server-side state.
You are invited to review RFC if you wish to explore these features in more detail. As far as we are aware, the Acegi Security implementation does comply with the minimum standards of this RFC. Particularly in the case of web request URI security, sometimes it is more convenient to assign configuration attributes against every possible secure object invocation.
There are also other situations where anonymous authentication would be desired, such as when an auditing interceptor queries the SecurityContextHolder to identify which principal was responsible for a given operation. Such classes can be authored with more robustness if they know the SecurityContextHolder always contains an Authentication object, and never null.
Acegi Security provides three classes that together provide an anoymous authentication feature. AnonymousAuthenticationToken is an implementation of Authentication , and stores the GrantedAuthority []s which apply to the anonymous principal. There is a corresponding AnonymousAuthenticationProvider , which is chained into the ProviderManager so that AnonymousAuthenticationTokens are accepted.
Finally, there is an AnonymousProcessingFilter, which is chained after the normal authentication mechanisms and automatically add an AnonymousAuthenticationToken to the SecurityContextHolder if there is no existing Authentication held there. The definition of the filter and authentication provider appears as follows:. The key is shared between the filter and authentication provider, so that tokens created by the former are accepted by the latter.
As explained earlier, the benefit of anonymous authentication is that all URI patterns can have security applied to them. For example:. This interface provides an isAnonymous Authentication method, which allows interested classes to take into account this special type of authentication status. If an AccessDeniedException is thrown, and the authentication is of an anonymous type, instead of throwing a forbidden response, the filter will instead commence the AuthenticationEntryPoint so the principal can authenticate properly.
This is a necessary distinction, otherwise principals would always be deemed "authenticated" and never be given an opportunity to login via form, basic, digest or some other normal authentication mechanism.
Remember-me authentication refers to web sites being able to remember the identity of a principal between sessions. This is typically accomplished by sending a cookie to the browser, with the cookie being detected during future sessions and causing automated login to take place.
Acegi Security provides the necessary hooks so that such operations can take place, along with providing a concrete implementation that uses hashing to preserve the security of cookie-based tokens. Remember-me authentication is not used with digest or basic authentication, given they are often not used with HttpSession s. Remember-me is used with AuthenticationProcessingFilter , and is implemented via hooks in the AbstractProcessingFilter superclass.
The hooks will invoke a concrete RememberMeServices at the appropriate times. The interface looks like this:. Please refer to JavaDocs for a fuller discussion on what the methods do, although note at this stage AbstractProcessingFilter only calls the loginFail and loginSuccess methods.
This interface therefore provides the underlaying remember-me implementation with sufficient notification of authentication-related events, and delegates to the implementation whenever a candidate web request might contain a cookie and wish to be remembered. This design allows any number of remember-me implementation strategies. In the interests of simplicity and avoiding the need for DAO implementations that specify write and create methods, Acegi Security's only concrete implementation, TokenBasedRememberMeServices , uses hashing to achieve a useful remember-me strategy.
In essence a cookie is sent to the browser upon successful interactive authentication, with that cookie being composed as follows:. As such the remember-me token is valid only for the period specified, and provided that the username, password and key does not change. Notably, this has a potential security issue issue in that a captured remember-me token will be usable from any user agent until such time as the token expires.
This is the same issue as with digest authentication. If a principal is aware a token has been captured, they can easily change their password and immediately invalidate all remember-me tokens on issue.
However, if more significant security is needed a rolling token approach should be used this would require a database or remember-me services should simply not be used. Some sort of logout command should be provided by the application typically via a JSP that invalidates the cookie upon user request. See the Contacts Sample application's logout. The beans required in an application context to enable remember-me services are as follows:.
This approach did not explicitly separate the function of HttpSession storage of SecurityContextHolder contents from the processing of authentication requests received through various protocols. In addition, the previous approach did not facilitate storage of non- Authentication objects between requests, which was limiting usefulness of the SecurityContextHolder system to member of the community.
For these reasons, the notion of well-known locations was abandoned, the HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter was established, and the purpose of authentication processing mechanisms was explicitly defined and limited to interaction with the SecurityContextHolder only.
There is no need to refer to well-known locations any more and we hope this clearer separation of responsibilities enhances understanding of the design. Very early versions of the Acegi Security System for Spring exclusively used Container Adapters for interfacing authentication with end users. Whilst this worked well, it required considerable time to support multiple container versions and the configuration itself was relatively time-consuming for developers.
Container Adapters enable the Acegi Security System for Spring to integrate directly with the containers used to host end user applications. This integration means that applications can continue to leverage the authentication and authorization capabilities built into containers such as isUserInRole and form-based or basic authentication , whilst benefiting from the enhanced security interception capabilities provided by the Acegi Security System for Spring it should be noted that Acegi Security also offers ContextHolderAwareRequestWrapper to deliver isUserInRole and similar Servlet Specification compatibility methods.
The integration between a container and the Acegi Security System for Spring is achieved through an adapter. The adapter provides a container-compatible user authentication provider, and needs to return a container-compatible user object. The adapter is instantiated by the container and is defined in a container-specific configuration file. The adapter then loads a Spring application context which defines the normal authentication manager settings, such as the authentication providers that can be used to authenticate the request.
The application context is usually named acegisecurity. Additional container adapters can easily be written. As is always the case, the container adapter generated Authentication object still needs to be authenticated by an AuthenticationManager when requested to do so by the AbstractSecurityInterceptor.
The AuthenticationManager needs to be certain the adapter-provided Authentication object is valid and was actually authenticated by a trusted adapter. Adapters create Authentication objects which are immutable and implement the AuthByAdapter interface. These objects store the hash of a key that is defined by the adapter.
This authentication provider is defined as follows:. The key must match the key that is defined in the container-specific configuration file that starts the adapter. To reiterate, this means the adapter will perform the initial authentication using providers such as DaoAuthenticationProvider , returning an AuthByAdapter instance that contains a hash code of the key. There is no requirement for additional authentication providers such as DaoAuthenticationProvider within the application-specific application context, as the only type of Authentication instance that will be presented by the application is from the container adapter.
Classloader issues are frequent with containers and the use of container adapters illustrates this further. Each container requires a very specific configuration. The installation instructions are provided below. Once installed, please take the time to try the sample application to ensure your container adapter is properly configured.
When using container adapters with the DaoAuthenticationProvider , ensure you set its forcePrincipalAsString property to true. An example realm entry:. Copy acegisecurity. Copy acegi-security-catalina-XX. The realm name indicated in your web. A work-around is to use a script such as follows:. There are two different ways of making spring context available to the Jboss integration classes. In this configuration acegisecurity. You have to bear in mind though, that SecurityContext is created and destroyed on each login request, so the login operation might become costly.
Alternatively, the second approach is to use Spring singleton capabilities through org. The required configuration for this approach is:. In the above code fragment, authenticationManager is a helper property that defines the expected name of the AuthenticationManager in case you have several defined in the IoC container.
The singletonId property references a bean defined in a beanRefFactory. The beanRefFactory. For example, to match the above example, your jboss-web. Resin provides several ways to support the container adapter.
In the instructions below we have elected to maximise consistency with other container adapter configurations. This will allow Resin users to simply deploy the sample application and confirm correct configuration. Unlike the container-wide acegisecurity.
Each web application will also contain a resin-web. Yale University produces an enterprise-wide single sign on system known as CAS. Unlike other initiatives, Yale's Central Authentication Service is open source, widely used, simple to understand, platform independent, and supports proxy capabilities.
The Acegi Security System for Spring fully supports CAS, and provides an easy migration path from single-application deployments of Acegi Security through to multiple-application deployments secured by an enterprise-wide CAS server.
Whilst the CAS web site above contains two documents that detail the architecture of CAS, we present the general overview again here within the context of the Acegi Security System for Spring. The following refers to CAS 2.
Somewhere in your enterprise you will need to setup a CAS server. Inside the WAR file you will customise the login and other single sign on pages displayed to users. You will also need to specify in the web. The PasswordHandler has a simple method that returns a boolean as to whether a given username and password is valid. Your PasswordHandler implementation will need to link into some type of backend authentication repository, such as an LDAP server or database.
If you are already running an existing CAS server instance, you will have already established a PasswordHandler. This class delegates through to the standard Acegi Security AuthenticationManager , enabling you to use a security configuration you might already have in place. Apart from the CAS server itself, the other key player is of course the secure web applications deployed throughout your enterprise. These web applications are known as "services". There are two types of services: standard services and proxy services.
A proxy service is able to request resources from other services on behalf of the user. This will be explained more fully later. Services can be developed in a large variety of languages, due to CAS 2.
This is handled transparently for you. The web user is browsing the service's public pages. CAS or Acegi Security is not involved. The user eventually requests a page that is either secure or one of the beans it uses is secure. Because the user's Authentication object or lack thereof caused an AuthenticationException , the SecurityEnforcementFilter will call the configured AuthenticationEntryPoint. After the user's browser redirects to CAS, they will be prompted for their username and password.
If the user presents a session cookie which indicates they've previously logged on, they will not be prompted to login again there is an exception to this procedure, which we'll cover later. CAS will use the PasswordHandler discussed above to decide whether the username and password is valid. Upon successful login, CAS will redirect the user's browser back to the original service. It will also include a ticket parameter, which is an opaque string representing the "service ticket".
The processing filter will construct a UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken representing the service ticket. The principal will be equal to CasProcessingFilter. This authentication request will then be handed to the configured AuthenticationManager.
CasAuthenticationProvider will validate the service ticket using a TicketValidator implementation. This implementation a ticket validation class included in the CAS client library. Back on the CAS server, the proxy validation request will be received. If any proxy was involved in the authentication discussed below , the list of proxies is also included in the XML response.
This pgtIou represents a proxy-granting ticket IOU. It will return to the CasAuthenticationProvider a TicketResponse , which includes the username mandatory , proxy list if any were involved , and proxy-granting ticket IOU if the proxy callback was requested. The CasProxyDecider indicates whether the proxy list in the TicketResponse is acceptable to the service. These names are largely self-explanatory, except NamedCasProxyDecider which allows a List of trusted proxies to be provided. The user's browser is redirected to the original page that caused the AuthenticationException.
As the Authentication object is now in the well-known location, it is handled like any other authentication approach. Usually the HttpSessionIntegrationFilter will be used to associate the Authentication object with the SecurityContextHolder for the duration of each request. It's good that you're still here! It might sound involved, but you can relax as the Acegi Security System for Spring classes hide much of the complexity.
Let's now look at how this is configured. To install, you will need to download and extract the CAS server archive. We used version 2. Copy an applicationContext.
A sample applicationContext. Note the granted authorities are ignored by CAS because it has no way of communicating the granted authorities to calling applications. Add or edit in the case of the authHandler property the following lines:. Copy the spring. Now use the ant dist task in the build. It is assumed you already know the basics of using the Acegi Security System for Spring, so these are not covered again below.
Only the CAS-specific beans are mentioned. You will need to add a ServiceProperties bean to your application context. This represents your service:. The sendRenew defaults to false, but should be set to true if your application is particularly sensitive.
What this parameter does is tell the CAS login service that a single sign on login is unacceptable. You need to modify the bean definition in Listing 8 to accommodate the custom AuthenticationProvider implementation. Simply replace the second line with:. In this article I've showed you how to configure Acegi Security in about one hour, giving you a basic infrastructure that's ready to work.
You've also seen some ways you can customize it further, including using a database instead of a property file for getting user credentials. The application source code is also set up to use Struts 2, rather than JSP, for presentation.
See the Resources section to learn more about Acegi Security and other technologies discussed in this article. This story, "Acegi Security in one hour" was originally published by JavaWorld. From Acegi security to Spring security draft. Udgrade main.
Enter the Acegi Security framework, an open source security framework designed for Spring. Created by Ben Alex, the framework has begun to gather a loyal. I am confused in choosing spring security or acegi security I came to know that acegi security is developed using spring and now called as. Java Ecosystem Infographic by JetBrains. Furthermore, it still does not approach secudity in the manner as described above- as an aspect.
For example, a web application presents the sprin with a prompt for username and password. I set up my app this way and got it working as desired in a few minutes. Post a comment Email Article Print Article. So, LoginBean seems to be working for now. Data APIs for Developers. Prior to access to the resource, interception determines whether or not the resource should be protected. This provider is easy to understand, configure, and demonstrate. If so, interception examines who made the call the principal and whether or spriny access should be granted.
Spring Security also has required an interface to encode the password to make it more secure. Therefore, the credentials were not checked and authorization has been denied.
February 2, at The BadCredentialsException is actually not caught, but is saved in the HttpSession object by Spring Security which is why you get it out with a key. Im new in Acegi thanks in advance.
I want to learn spring framework with the spring security. The first value informs the interceptor to convert all URLs to lowercase before evaluating.
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